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 1 
Summary 
The increased significance of intellectual property rights, rapid development 
of easier dissemination of protected works and the subsequent concern for 
protection has lead right holders to seek new ways of countering online 
piracy. In the past decade, a new regime of targeting online intermediaries 
with blocking injunctions has emerged. Carrying no actual liability for 
infringement, intermediaries find themselves ordered to implement blocking 
injunctions purposed to discourage Internet users from accessing illegal 
content. This phenomenon raises a multitude of issues concerning the 
appropriateness of bestowing obligations upon an innocent intermediary, 
and along with it the balancing of property right interests towards 
fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and information, 
freedom to conduct a business and data privacy protection concerns. The 
issues are highlighted when attempting to discern the requisites for issuing a 
blocking injunction; interpretation of this common legal framework has 
diverged in the member states applying them.  
 
 A study of the European Court of Justice’s case law paired with the 
doctrine surrounding the legal framework reveals a core set of requisites that 
must be taken into account for the court tasked with assessing a blocking 
order application. Of these requisites, the proportionality assessment surface 
as the particularly complex issue. However, its complexity serves to 
highlight the importance of the accumulated requisites, while the balancing 
act contained within this assessment remains a question of legal review in 
casu. Further clarity and legal foreseeability as to the particular requisites 
and their handling is required for harmonization, but the proportionality 
assessment is not in such a dire need of restructuring as some may argue. 
The well-established nationality of especially copyright protection, where 
differing legal traditions affect the assessment, poses more of a hindrance to 
a clear and foreseeable harmonization of assessing blocking injunctions. 
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Sammanfattning 
Den ökade betydelsen av immateriella rättigheter, utvecklade möjligheter 
till lättare spridning av skyddat material och därigenom ett ökat 
skyddsbehov har föranlett rättighetsinnehavare att söka nya 
tillvägagångssätt för bekämpning av immaterialrättsintrång online. Under 
det senaste årtiondet har ett nytt vapen i form av förbudsförelägganden mot 
mellanhänder trätt fram. Utan något faktiskt ansvar för eget intrång åläggs 
mellanhänder, såsom internetleverantörer och siter, att implementera 
blockeringsåtgärder i syfte att motverka internetanvändares åtkomst till 
innehåll som gjorts tillgängligt på olagligt sätt. Detta har väckt en lång rad 
tolkningsfrågor kring ändamålsenligheten i att belasta oskyldiga 
mellanhänder med långtgående förpliktelser, och synliggjort behovet av att 
balansera immateriella rättigheter mot grundläggande rättigheter såsom 
yttrande- och informationsfrihet, näringsfrihet och skydd av 
personuppgifter. Frågeställningarna träder särskilt fram i ljuset av försöken 
att utröna de enskilda rekvisiten för utfärdande av sådana förelägganden; 
tolkningarna av det gemensamma regelverket har kraftigt avvikit mellan de 
olika medlemsstaternas domstolar. 
 
Genom studier av EU-domstolens praxis kombinerat med den doktrin som 
omgärdar de rättsliga ramarna åskådliggörs en kärna av rekvisit nödvändiga 
för den domstol som ställs inför en begäran om blockering. Av dessa 
rekvisit framträder proportionalitetskravet som särskilt svårbedömt. Dess 
komplexitet belyser dock snarare de ackumulerade rekvisitens samlade 
betydelse, varpå balanseringen av rättigheterna förblir en fråga in casu som 
ankommer på den nationella domstolen. Rekvisiten är förvisso i behov av 
fortsatta klargöranden och förutsebarhet, men proportionalitetsbedömningen 
är inte i ett sådant skriande behov av omstrukturering som vissa gör 
gällande. Den i hög grad nationella präglingen av immaterialrätter 
medlemsstater emellan utgör ett större hinder för en tydlig och förutsebar 
harmonisering av blockering via förbudsförelägganden. 
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Preface 
The issues surrounding intermediaries and their role in the advancement of 
regulating the online environment has become a highly acknowledged and 
fiercely debated topic within intellectual property law; not only as a matter 
of investments and protection of economic interests within business law, but 
for society as a whole. Its intersection, or perhaps rather its conflict with 
fundamental freedoms and rights has served to bring it to the attention of 
mainstream media, and rightly so.  
 
The seemingly straightforward question of how to apply the powers of 
injunctions granted to national courts by the European Union encompass 
wider issues concerning the way we view and use the Internet, immaterial 
property and basic human rights. My interest in this area awoke during my 
studies of European intellectual property law. What initially appeared to be 
a rather comprehensible legal patchwork, except for a few minor 
transnational issues thrown in between, slowly entangled me in a way I 
suspect many intellectual property lawyers may have encountered 
themselves. From there on it went, along with numerous lectures from 
visiting speakers across Europe who fuelled this interest, until I found the 
topic of my graduate thesis contained within a lecture given by Prof. Dr. 
Annette Kur of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition.  
 
Thus, I have her along with a vast list of faculty members who have helped 
and challenged me during my studies at Lund and Stockholm University to 
thank for the achievement of this work, with a specific thank you to my 
supervisor Ulf Maunsbach. As for my colleagues, friends, family and Li; 
words cannot suffice. 
 
Stockholm, 12 April 2015 
 
Martin Husberg 
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Abbreviations 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
DNS  Domain Name System 
DPI  Deep Packet Inspection 
ECHR  European Convention on the Protection of 
  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
EU  European Union 
EUC  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
  Union 
IP  Intellectual Property 
IP address  Internet Protocol Address 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
ISSP  Internet Society Service Provider 
P2P  Peer-to-Peer 
TRIPS  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
  Intellectual Property Rights 
URL  Uniform Resource Locator 
WCT  WIPO Copyright Treaty 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organization 
WPPT  WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
 
In the past decades of property law, the significance of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) has seen an unmatched growth. With steadily accelerated 
technological developments and increased internet access worldwide, IPR 
holders have undergone challenges to adapt and fully take advantage of both 
the established and potential values that IPRs infer.  
 
Within the context of immaterial property, the possession and use thereof 
give rise to complex issues of where the boundaries of these rights are to be 
drawn. At the other end of the same spectrum lie equally recognisable and 
fundamental rights, such as the freedom of information and right to conduct 
business. Internet service providers (ISPs) and other intermediaries play an 
important role on the battlefield of these rights; they offer platforms upon 
which traders and users congregate, and where infringing acts occur. Indeed, 
their power in shaping the Internet is widely recognized in the instruments 
regulating IPR on a European Union (EU) level. 
 
In recent years, the number of cases regarding injunctions towards 
intermediaries has risen. Both national and supranational courts have been 
posed with balancing countervailing interests against each other, signifying 
a trend in European intellectual property law; without bearing any direct 
responsibility for actual IPR infringement themselves, intermediaries are 
imposed with implementing blocking injunctions towards users of their 
services. On the one hand lies the interest of established IPR holders, and on 
the other the right for intermediaries to conduct business freely, as well as 
users’ right to information. The sheer speed of the technological 
development and the subsequent torrent of infringing acts perpetuated via 
the Internet, having left the legislators and political powers tasked with 
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harmonizing and adapting the system lagging behind, therefore seizes the 
courts with the task of striking a balance. In the interest of a harmonized and 
consistent intellectual property law within the European Union, the question 
thus remain; what are the requisites for issuing a blocking order towards an 
intermediary in the context of an IPR infringement, and how should these 
requisites be interpreted and applied? 
 
1.2 Purpose 
This thesis aims to present and analyse recent development in European 
case law where IPR holders has sought blocking injunctions against various 
intermediaries, with the specific purpose of discerning the requisites 
required of such injunctions. 
 No gathered requisites are to be found in any definite article of the legal 
framework, and the aspects taken into account by the courts in case law are 
shifting and varying. This analysis serves to establish the thresholds for 
issuing such injunctions by discerning each requisite, and analyzing its role 
in the context of judicial review. 
Adjudicating blocking orders often involve a balancing act between 
upholding intellectual property rights vis-à-vis rights of the intermediaries 
and users (such as the right to freedom of information, data privacy 
protection and freedom to conduct business) the question of where this 
balance can be fairly struck lies inherent. Driven too far, the responsibilities 
of intermediaries to comply with upholding the IPR holders’ rights may 
amount to monitoring and censorship of the Internet. How should national 
courts, IPR holders and intermediaries alike interpret the requisites that form 
the legal basis of blocking-order injunctions, especially in the interest of a 
harmonized intellectual property law in the European Union?  
The thesis therefore aims to intertwine these issues in its analysis in an 
effort to clarify the requisites for issuing blocking injunctions towards 
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intermediaries, with an emphasis on the balancing between countervailing 
rights and obligations, as well as provide a commentary of how these rights 
effect upon such a legal remedy should be treated de lege ferenda. 
 
1.3 Method and delimitation 
The author primarily makes use of a qualitative method of legal dogmatics, 
which examines statutory law, travaux préparatoires, doctrine and case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).  
The legal dogmatic method, also referred to as the traditional legal method, 
holds different implications, despite its name. It often refers to what material 
is used and how, when arranging sources hierarchically according to the 
particular legal doctrine1, where e.g. statues takes precedence over 
preparatory work such as the particular legal doctrine of Swedish law (Sw. 
Rättskälleläran).  
The legal dogmatic method may however also refer to its function and 
purpose, when determining what constitutes sound legal argumentation, as 
well as its immanence, i.e. its position of working and viewing this work 
from within the frame of de lege lata.2 
This thesis employs the legal dogmatic method with principal regard to the 
material used. Therefore, it bears note to emphasize the difference in legal 
dogmatic methods used for sources within European Union law and other 
sources of international law, which therefore implies slight differences in 
the application of the particular legal doctrine between these two sources.  
In addition to established sources within the legal dogmatic method, 
empirical studies and scientific reports are referred to within the material 
                                                
1 Peczenik, A., ‘Volume 4: Scienta Juris, Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a 
Source of Law‘ in Pattaro, E., (ed.) A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General 
Jurisprudence, (Springer Netherlands, 2007), p. 3. 
2 Sandgren, C., Är rättsdogmatiken dogmatisk?, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, Vol. 118, nr. 
4-5, (2005), p. 649. 
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brought forth by the legal dogmatic method in this study. Hence, the method 
used in this thesis serves to discern the current applicable law, but also as a 
foundation for analyzing said law and provide an academic base for drawing 
conclusions of its prospective development.  
The focus lies primarily upon the matter of definitive blocking injunctions. 
While disconnection injunctions, de-indexing and interlocutory injunctions 
often share the same legal foundation and may provide relevant 
argumentation, other legal remedies such as damages are not examined, nor 
is the related issue of secondary tort liability explored outside its relevance 
to injunctions. The rising trend of graduate response schemes3 in connection 
to blocking injunctions is not presented or analysed more so than where it 
serves to further the analysis of the particular topics of this study. The 
presentations and analysis of the relevant directives referred to in 1.4 below 
are all limited to their relevance concerning blocking injunctions. 
 
1.4 Sources of law 
EU law and its endeavour towards a fruitful harmonization is the core of this 
thesis. Therefore, the legal sources used are those commonly found in 
European Union law; primarily intellectual property law focusing on 
copyright and, to a lesser extent, trademark rights, along with the relevant 
fundamental rights of freedom of information, data privacy protection and 
the right to conduct a business, mainly found in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EUC), and the Data Protection Directive.4 
As a legal person, its international treaties bind the EU.  The influence and 
impact of such treaties and agreements cannot be overlooked. Though they 
                                                
3 For a more in-depth look at graduate response schemes, see Edwards, L., Role and 
Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights, 
(WIPO Study, 2011), pp. 30 ff. 
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995. 
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are to a large extent now already incorporated into the European Union’s 
“own” legal framework, the importance of its cooperation with the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the EUs membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), in particular with regard to the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT) of the WIPO, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) of the WTO respectively, cannot be 
overlooked. Two of the main EU directives of this thesis are primarily 
‘European’ implementations of these agreements. The Infosoc Directive5 
implemented the WCT and the WPPT, and therefore covers its material 
aspects and then some.6 Similarly, TRIPS has served as an important 
stepping-stone in drafting the Enforcement Directive7, which in many 
aspects also goes beyond the minimum requirements of IPR protection 
stipulated in TRIPS.8 The E-Commerce Directive9 is also influenced by the 
WCT in its construction; this is further described in chapter 2.2. 
Having provided the foundation for its subsequent EU law, the material 
aspects of these international agreements are enshrined within the legal 
framework described in chapter 2 of this thesis. Further reference to TRIPS, 
the WCT and the WPPT is consequently purposely excluded, though the 
importance of adherence to its articles and principles by way of pacta sunt 
servanda is, of course, always present. 
 
                                                
5 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L 167, 22.6.2001. 
6 Stamatoudi, I. and Torremans, P., EU Copyright Law : A Commentary (Edward Elgar, 
2014), p. 397. 
7 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, OJ L 195, 2.6.2004. 
8 Vrins, O. and Schneider, M., ‘Cross-Border Enforcement of Intellectual Property: The 
European Union’, in Torremans, P., (ed.) Research Handbook on Cross-border 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property, (Edward Elgar, 2014), p. 176. 
9 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market, OJ L 178, 17.7.2000. 
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1.5 Outline 
The field of IPR infringement in an online environment provides a multitude 
of interplaying aspects. In trying to assess the requisites necessary for a 
blocking-order, an IPR infringement must have been deemed to take place. 
Correspondingly, this thesis takes its premise from an outset of actual 
infringements having occurred, and begins by examining the legal basis for 
the injunctions at hand.  
The thesis therefore begins with a presentation of the relevant legal 
framework of allowing injunctions toward intermediaries, most notably the 
three EU directives at hand.  
From these sources, the actual responsibility of the intermediary may be 
determined, which leads us to examine the boundaries of what measures can 
be demanded of intermediaries. The relevant statues and directives that form 
the basis of the boundaries are presented and inserted into the context of this 
thesis. These consist of the fundamental, countervailing rights at hand. 
Subsequently, the application and interpretation of the aforementioned legal 
framework is examined through case law of the CJEU.  
Lastly, the thesis intends to summarize the requisites for issuing blocking-
orders towards Internet intermediaries, as well as an analysis of how these 
blocking orders must be drafted. Each issue connected to the requisites of 
blocking order-injunctions is examined individually. The analysis also 
intends to provide a comment on how these injunctions may affect public 
interests as well as the harmonization process for blocking injunctions in the 
European Union, and how it can and should function de lege ferenda. 
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2 Legal foundation of 
injunctions 
2.1 IPR rights and The EU Charter 
The importance of national regulation is an aspect that sets IPRs apart from 
other forms of protection under the umbrella of EU law. For copyright 
protection, this is especially true. As a relatively new phenomenon of 
property, the field of IPR protection is characterized by being chiefly 
maintained and enforced on a national level; international treaties and EU 
law often serve to pinpoint common features which the member states of the 
European Union has been able to agree upon, but the lack of harmonization 
is still evident.10 With this in mind, the protection of IPRs offered on a EU 
level stem from a multitude of sources. Applying the particular legal 
doctrine, Article 17 (2) of the EUC, which concisely reads “intellectual 
property shall be protected” serves as a particularly manifest foundation for 
the recognition of IPRs, given the EUCs elevation to a document of the 
same legal value as the European Union treaties11 by way of the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.12 
 
Battling IPR infringement, the right holders possess a wide range of 
enforcement possibilities consisting of both criminal and civil sanctions 
depending on the type of infringement. Injunctions serve as a possibility for 
IPR holders to force intermediaries whose services are relied upon by a third 
party infringing the rights of the IPR holder to take action. The legal basis 
for these injunctions consists of the following three directives presented 
below. 
                                                
10 Kur, A. and Dreier, T., European Intellectual Property Law – Text Cases, and Materials, 
(Edward Elgar, 2013) pp. 2-12. 
11 Treaty on the European Union, and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. 
12 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007. 
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2.2 The E-Commerce Directive  
Beginning with the E-Commerce Directive, the European Union sought 
provide legal certainty for both businesses and private persons; an important 
part of this was to harmonize certain limits of liabilities for Internet 
intermediaries in their role as information society service providers 
(ISSPs)13. The definition in article 2 of the directive describes the 
intermediary as a ‘provider of an information society service’, and 
‘information society services’ are further defined as “any service normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the 
individual request of a recipient of services.”14 As sweeping as this 
definition may be, its application rarely becomes an issue of blocking 
injunction proceedings.15 
 
The overarching goal of the directive is painted with smaller brush strokes; 
recital 40 of the directive states its raison d’être as fostering “the 
development of rapid and reliable procedures for removing and disabling 
access to illegal information”, and in recital 41 striking “a balance between 
the different interests at stake and establishes principles upon which 
industry agreements and standards can be based”; such mechanisms should, 
according to the directive, be developed voluntarily between the concerned 
parties. The E-Commerce Directive functions as a horizontal instrument of 
minimum harmonization, regulating intermediaries’ liabilities across all 
kind of content, with the exceptions of gambling and privacy protection,16 
although the latter exception has come under scrutiny within the directive as 
well. 
 
                                                
13 ‘Information society service providers’ are but one of many definitions regarding Internet 
intermediaries; further aspects on intermediaries’ differing definitions and roles are 
presented below at 3.1. 
14 E-Commerce Directive, Article 2 (a) and (b), with reference to the Technical Standards 
and Regulations Directive 98/34/EC, Article 1. 
15 Defining the intermediary and its role may however prove important with regard to the 
assessment of proportionality; this is treated below at 3.1.2 and 5.7. 
16 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 7. 
 13 
Given the economic market importance of the Internet, the directive seeks to 
preclude a fragmentation of the internal market.17 Avoiding such 
fragmentation thus requires a certain amount of foreseeability and legal 
certainty for the intermediaries. This is achieved through the construction of 
several “safe harbours”. This mode of legislation, which goes about defining 
what intermediaries are not liable for, partly demonstrates how the E-
Commerce Directive models itself somewhat upon the WCT and the way 
liability exemptions were set out therein.18 
 
Speaking within the context of injunctions, all of the directive’s main points 
of interest lie in its liability exemptions. These exemptions form the “safe 
harbours” of Internet intermediaries; grounds for which they may escape 
liability even if an IPR infringement has occurred.  
 
The safe harbours are found in Article 12 (the mere conduit defence) aimed 
at intermediaries merely transmitting information or providing access to a 
communication network; Article 13 concerning caching, a form of 
temporary and automatized storage process; Article 14 concerning third-
party content made available on the intermediary’s server (the hosting 
defence); and lastly, the prohibition for member states to impose upon the 
ISP a general obligation to monitor the information transmitted or stored 
(monitoring prohibition), found in Article 15.19  
Each safe harbour requires a level of passivity, which differs from each 
other. The passivity is usually based on to what extent the intermediary 
selects and modifies the data it stores, as well as to what extent it selects the 
recipient of the data. The mere conduit defence does not allow any initiative 
to the above. Caching allows the intermediary to select the data and the 
recipient, but allows no modification. The hosting defence has the lowest 
                                                
17 Feiler, L., Website Blocking Injunctions under EU and U.S. Copyright Law—Slow Death 
of the Global Internet or Emergence of the Rule of National Copyright Law?, Transatlantic 
Technology Law Forum (TTLF) Working Paper No. 13, (2012), pp. 67-68. Available at: 
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/203758/doc/slspublic/feiler_wp
13.pdf, last visited on February 6, 2015. 
18 Kur, supra note 10, p. 451. 
19 See further below at 3.3.3. 
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requirement of passivity; as long as the user of the intermediary’s services 
does not act under the authority or control of the intermediary, the passivity 
requirement is fulfilled.20 
However, these exemptions are not without derogations and exceptions; a 
legal basis for IPR holders to seek injunctions is embedded directly in 
Article 12 (3) itself, which expressively allows for injunctions towards 
intermediaries in order to combat or prevent infringements. As per the 
hosting defence, an ISP may only rely upon it up until the point where they 
attain knowledge of the infringing activities; when informed, they must take 
immediate action to remove access to the infringing content. 
  
A limit to the monitoring prohibition is found in recital 47 of the directive, 
which states that the prohibition of Article 15 “does not concern monitoring 
obligations in a specific case”; only ”obligations of a general nature”. This 
allows courts and national authorities to order an ISP to monitor and filter 
their content for a specific website.21 The specificity of a blocking 
injunction is thus revealed as a relevant factor here. 
 
Further, the “duty of care” found in recital 48 of the directive provides 
further exemption from the monitoring prohibition, as ISPs are required to 
“apply duties of care […] specified by national law, in order to detect and 
prevent certain types of illegal activities”. However, this duty is usually 
understood to function as a tool for combating illegal activities concerning 
criminal and public law rather than private interests of IPR holders, though 
the ambiguous wording does leave its purpose open to interpretation.22 
 
The E-Commerce Directive (specifically its Article 14) provided IPR 
holders with a supranational legal framework for issuing warnings to 
intermediaries that they host illegal content, and risk liability of IPR 
                                                
20 DLA Piper, EU Study on the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information 
Society: New Rules for a New Age? – 6. Liability of Online Intermediaries, EU Publications 
Office, (2009), pp. 8-9. 
21 Stamatoudi, supra note 6, p. 508. 
22 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 10. 
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infringement by not taking action after having been informed; these so-
called “notice and takedown” procedures has lead to the intermediaries 
(rather than the liable infringers) becoming the prominent “targets” through 
the use of injunctions.23 
 
2.3 The Infosoc Directive 
The Infosoc Directive intended to harmonize the scope of protection 
regarding copyright and related rights. For injunctions, this resulted in a 
clear and concise legal basis afforded in Article 8 (3): 
 
“Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for 
an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third 
party to infringe a copyright or related right.” 
 
As evident in its ninth recital, the Infosoc Directive is to provide IPR 
holders with a “high level of protection”, indicating a strong footing for 
copyright holders. For the sake of clarity, recital 45 states that these 
injunctions are unaffected by any liability limitations found in the E-
Commerce Directive; indeed, the implementation date of both directives 
were coordinated for reasons such as interplays of these kind.24 
 
  The role of intermediaries in enforcing the Infosoc Directive was foretold 
in recital 59, which states; “the services of intermediaries may increasingly 
be used by third parties for infringing activities. In many cases such 
intermediaries are best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end.” 
Even so, this wording may be interpreted e contrario as well, implying that 
courts may also note possible situations where the intermediary is a rather ill 
suited target for an injunction. 25 
                                                
23 Vrins and Schneider, supra note 8, pp. 296-297. 
24 Stamatoudi, supra note 6, p. 513-514. 
25 Savola, P., Proportionality of Website Blocking: Internet Connectivity Providers as 
Copyright Enforcers, Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and 
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2.4 The Enforcement Directive  
After the introduction and recognition of IPRs through the E-Commerce and 
Infosoc directives, enforcement of these rights on a EU level went largely 
unaddressed until 2004. The Enforcement Directive was introduced as a 
horizontal instrument creating rights and obligations for private parties. The 
directive refers to all types of IPRs, including inter alia copyright and 
related rights and trademark rights.26 
 
Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive functions as an all-encompassing 
basis for allowing IPR holders to seek injunctions towards intermediaries. 
Its third sentence reads: 
”Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to 
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a 
third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to 
Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC.” 
Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive summarizes the scope of criteria 
necessary for justifying any remedy available under the directive, including 
injunctions, and states that injunctions shall: 
”…be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or 
costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. 
2.   Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to 
avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for 
safeguards against their abuse.” 
Recital 23 of the directive leaves the conditions and procedures of these 
injunctions in the hand of the member states. Again, the pursuit of 
                                                                                                                        
Electronic Commerce Law (JIPITEC) Vol. 5, (2014) p. 122, see also Feiler, supra note 17, 
p. 47.  
26 Kur, supra note 10, pp. 440-441. 
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coherence is evident as the recital references the harmonization efforts of 
the Infosoc Directive, which happens to utilize the same principle of 
subsidiarity.  
Article 2 of the Enforcement Directive states that the directive leaves also 
the provisions of the E-Commerce Directive unaffected; an important aspect 
with regards to the so-called “safe harbours” offered by the latter.27 
Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive provides the member states with the 
option of ensuring that IPR holders may obtain information on the "origin 
and distribution networks” behind the infringement. Although already pre-
existent in several states, it became a novelty in some through the adoption 
of the directive.28 
 
                                                
27 Headdon, T., Beyond liability: on the availability and scope of injunctions against online 
intermediaries after L'Oreal v eBay, European Intellectual Property Review (EIPR) Vol. 
34, nr. 3 (2012), p. 138. 
28 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Analysis of the 
application of Directive 2004/48/EC, COM (2010) 779, p. 11. 
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3 Range of injunctions 
3.1 The Role of the Intermediary 
The obligations of Internet intermediaries differ depending on a number of 
factors, inter alia their role in the chain of communications. Before defining 
intermediaries in the sense of EU’s legal framework, an analysis of their 
underlying function is necessary; especially as to what roles they play in 
practice.   
 
3.1.1 Connectivity and hosting providers 
An important practical distinction between various intermediaries is that of 
‘connectivity provider’ vis-à-vis ‘hosting provider’, wherein the former acts 
as the main provider of communications; they may carry the role of access 
network provider, i.e. providing the initial access to connectivity (a 
“backbone provider”), offering connectivity between access network 
providers or peer-to-peer connectivity.29 The hosting provider is situated 
further downstream, as it provides hosting of web sites or files. In the 
context of blocking injunctions stemming from EU law, there is no exact 
legal definition of these two types of information society service providers 
to be found, as they are both subsumed under the category of “service 
provider” in the E-Commerce Directive.30 
 
These days, the line separating ‘pure’ connectivity providers from other 
types of Information society service providers has become somewhat 
blurred, as telecommunication providers (such as phone companies) and 
other actors previously categorized as ‘backbone’ providers have expanded 
their business models to include more content-based services, while the role 
                                                
29 Savola, supra note 25, p. 117 with reference to the CJEU’s analysis in L’Oreal v. eBay 
(C-324/09). 
30 See above 2.2. 
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of ‘traditional’ ISPs has experienced a mirrored development, developing 
services reminiscent of ‘backbone’ providers.31 However, the distinction 
may be relevant as connectivity providers and hosting providers face 
different thresholds for incurring liability – and as discussed below in 
chapter 5.7, these differences may in turn affect the proportionality-
assessment of injunctions. 
 
How do these liabilities differ? As mentioned above in 2.2, connectivity 
providers and other mere conduit providers are exempt from liability under 
Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive. This “safe harbour” is only valid 
when the ISPs role is that of a passive and neutral intermediary. For hosting 
providers, their “safe harbour” is built upon lack of knowledge and 
awareness – when obtaining awareness of infringement, the exemption is 
only valid if they act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the 
infringing content.32  
 
3.1.2 Defining ‘intermediaries’ 
The E-Commerce Directive defines the intermediary as a ‘provider of an 
information society service’, i.e. an ISSP.33 The Internet service provider 
(ISP) falls under this category, and is usually treated as a synonym; 
something a quick study of the CJEU case law aptly confirms. A broad 
definition of ISSPs and ISPs would therefore include anyone who provides 
‘technical support and services in and around the internet’.34 This 
encompasses connectivity and hosting providers, the latter of which 
includes forums of social media and “user-mediated content” such as 
Facebook and YouTube; online marketplaces such as eBay, and cloud 
                                                
31 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 4. 
32 Savola, supra note 25, p. 117. 
33 E-Commerce Directive, Article 2 (a) and (b), with reference to the Technical Standards 
and Regulations Directive 98/34/EC, Article 1, see above 2.2. 
34 Kur, supra note 10, p. 449, see also Stamatoudi, I., ’The Role of Internet Service 
Providers in Copyright Infringements on the Internet under EU Law’, in Torremans, P., 
(ed.) Research Handbook on Cross-border Enforcement of Intellectual Property, (Edward 
Elgar, 2014), p. 789. 
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computing services. Search engines such as Google and Bing fall roughly 
into the latter category, although their modus operandi differ somewhat – 
see below in 3.1.3.2.  
 
Hence, the spectrum is incredibly wide, and the ‘ISP’ is to be construed as a 
broad concept.35 The ambiguity of the definition of an ISP, as well as many 
other key aspects in defining their role and in consequence their liability, 
has been noted time and again.36 Perhaps a certain amount of flexibility 
must be afforded given the rapid development described above. The 
broadest definition available is used in this thesis; the term ‘ISP’ therefore 
encompasses all kinds of ‘information society service providers’, and covers 
both connectivity and hosting providers; the latter including marketplaces, 
search engines and forums. To further illustrate this, article 8 (3) of the 
Infosoc Directive defines ‘intermediary’ as any provider “who carries a third 
party’s infringement”, which is an equally valid definition consistent with 
the definitions described above. One may also note that according to the E-
Commerce Directive, an ISP may be a legal as well as a natural person.37  
 
In conclusion, the terms ‘ISSP’, ‘ISP’ and ‘intermediary’ all represent the 
same legal subject with regard to blocking injunctions; as they are used 
interchangeably in case law, this must be noted for the purpose of this 
thesis.  
 
The further relevant distinctions between intermediaries requires a few 
words on the types of services and modus operandi used in the most 
important aspects of IPR infringement. 
 
                                                
35 Stamatoudi, supra note 6, p. 507, and European Commission, supra note 28, p. 14. 
36 DLA Piper, supra note 20, pp. 10-18, see also Feiler, supra note 17, p. 14. 
37 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 8. 
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3.1.3 Different technical modes of infringement 
3.1.3.1 Peer-to-peer 
 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing is a method of infringement in which illegal 
content is downloaded directly between users through the aid of 
intermediaries. P2P infringement became widespread through intermediaries 
such as Napster, Grokster, Limewire and Kazaa. This technique later 
evolved with the advent of the “BitTorrent” protocol. Without going into 
detail, sites such as the famously notorious Pirate Bay acts as intermediaries 
in the sense of hosting not the illegal content itself, but torrent files and 
trackers which enable P2P users to engage in file sharing.38 
 
3.1.3.2 Linking 
 
The issue of linking and copyright was long heavily debated and plagued by 
disharmony in national courts. As the importance of search engines and 
various ISPs in “organizing” the Internet grew, it became subject for 
discussion and investigation by the European Commission.  
 
It finally fell upon the ECJ to take a stand on this matter by way of its 
judgment in Svensson v. Retriever C-466/12. Websites who via hyperlinks 
redirect users to protected works which are already made freely available on 
the internet were found exempt from liability of copyright infringement due 
to the works having already been communicated to the same public by the 
original publication; the key here was thus whether communication (by 
linking) took place to a new public, to which the court responded negatively.  
 
Note however that the judgment only concerned linking to other sites; not 
imbedded links. For Google and other search engines, who in essence only 
                                                
38 Wesselingh, E.M, ’Website Blocking: Evolution or Revolution? 10 Years of Copyright 
Enforcement by Private Third Parties’, Internet, Law and Politics. A Decade of 
Transformations, Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Internet, Law & 
Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, (Barcelona, 2014), p. 62. 
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create links to material spread over the Internet and seldom make us of 
imbedded links, this was of great importance in the context of notice and 
takedown procedures, and as such indirectly for injunctions.39 
 
3.1.3.3 Streaming 
 
In the past five years, IPR infringement through direct streaming of illegal 
content from hosting sites has become the prevalent form of copyright 
infringement online. The most severe disadvantage IPR holders face is 
simple; a high level of anonymity afforded to the users engaging in such 
behaviour. When engaging in P2P file sharing, users usually disclose their 
IP address; IPR holders could accordingly participate in this activity 
themselves, allowing to obtain both information and evidence on P2P file 
sharer’s identity and IPR infringement. Through streaming, an IPR holder 
cannot obtain the identity with the same ease as through P2P-technology, 
seeing how the user’s IP-address is shared only with the website linking the 
content and the hosting provider.40 The website in question may further be 
hosted in places with weak jurisdiction. The ease with which these 
infringements are perpetrated contributes to both its expanse and difficulty 
to combat. 
 
3.1.4 The choice of targeting intermediaries 
The inefficiency in pursuing each and every infringement at its source 
became apparent for IPR holders everywhere quite soon. Although it may 
seem harsh to impose responsibility on intermediaries for the actions of 
third parties, the often-present contractual relationship between ISPs and 
their subscribers, paired with their close proximity to the technical solution, 
i.e. the intermediary being the one best placed to disconnect users or 
otherwise “block” the infringements, serves as the main causes for IPR 
                                                
39 Edwards, supra note 3, pp. 13-14. 
40 Feiler, supra note 17, p. 3.  
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holders seeking injunctions towards intermediaries.41 Additionally, the 
prospects of garnering economic compensation from an established 
intermediary (who fails to comply with a blocking injunction) rather than 
suing a private infringer would usually be deemed more favourable. 
Understandably, during the early days of establishing the E-Commerce 
Directive ISPs sought to classify themselves as neutral carriers of 
information with regard to the liabilities they potentially faced.42 
 
3.1.4.1 Choosing which intermediary 
 
There may be several intermediaries in the chain of infringing 
communication – and blocking may be allowed towards several of them. 
The choice usually lies between the ISPs providing Internet connectivity to 
the host of the infringing website, or towards the end-users’ ISP, and lastly 
towards “transit” ISPs situated between the former two. Of these, the end-
users’ connectivity provider has been the natural target for most IPR 
holders.43  
 
Why is this? Given the above dilemma of Internet user’s anonymity44 when 
taking advantage of infringing streaming services, paired with the hosting 
provider’s safe harbour of Article 14 in the E-Commerce Directive45 and the 
linking website’s location often to be found in jurisdictions of low copyright 
protection, “targeting” the end-user’s connectivity provider best serves the 
IPR holders’ interest, as it “strikes” a wider and more effective blow.46  
 
                                                
41 Headdon, supra note 27, p. 137. 
42 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 5. 
43 Savola, P., The Ultimate Copyright Shopping Opportunity – Jurisdiction and Choice of 
Law in Website Blocking Injunctions, International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law (IIC), Vol. 45, (2014), pp. 305-306, and Wesselingh, supra note 38, p. 
63.  
44 See above 3.1.3.3. 
45 Connectivity providers also benefit from safe harbours; however, in order to target 
hosting providers, IPR holders must continuously screen their activities. A hosting provider 
may also more easily transfer the content elsewhere. 
46 Feiler, supra note 17, pp. 3-4. 
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3.1.4.2 Liability of the intermediary 
 
As mentioned, the intermediary need not be liable per se – it has been 
argued whether national law may require at least a secondary liability in 
order to grant an injunction, but this might run contrary to the minimum 
requirement of protection awarded by e.g. Art 8 (3) of the Infosoc Directive, 
as it would severely restrict the possibilities of obtaining an injunction. The 
fact that many intermediaries cannot fall liable due to the safe harbours of 
the E-Commerce Directive interplays with this argument.47 The European 
Commission observed the difficulty of correctly implementing the legal 
framework of injunctions, in particular when distinguishing its construction 
of an “autonomous” responsibility from actual liability, with several 
member states often requiring the existence of secondary liability.48 
 
Based on the central role played by intermediaries, the IPR holders have a 
logical economic interest in expanding their liability. When this is deemed 
impossible, for instance due to the safe harbours of the E-Commerce 
Directive, the injunctions serve as an indirect way of accomplishing the 
same goals.49 In trying to ease the sense of expanding liabilities, the 
European Commission propagated an alternate view in their analysis of the 
Enforcement Directive’s application, stating that the intermediary is simply 
often in the best position to end infringements50, and the injunctions should 
therefore not be viewed as a penalty.51  
 
For P2P intermediaries, the assessment has focused on the amount of 
evidence relating to the intent of infringement –as the Pirate Bay and similar 
sites usually are deemed as structured specifically for illegal file sharing; 
hence, intent is easily proven. For user-mediated content sites such as 
YouTube, the assessment has rather focused on the actual knowledge of 
                                                
47 Husovec, M. and Peguera, M., Much Ado About Little: Privately Litigated Internet 
Disconnection Injunctions, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law (IIC) Vol. 2, (2015), pp. 3 and 15. 
48 European Commission, supra note 28, p. 18. 
49 Savola, supra note 43, p. 290. 
50 Cf. recital 59 of the Infosoc Directive and 2.2 above. 
51 European Commission, supra note 28, p. 16. 
 25 
infringing content, and as such the same assessments that occur when 
examining the boundaries of liability exemptions for ISPs become more 
relevant than questions of whether the ISP has any intent of infringement or 
at least financial gain thereof.52 
 
3.2 Modes of blocking 
As for the implementation of a blocking injunction, there are several modes 
available. Through recent CJEU case law, the mode of blocking is now an 
open choice for the intermediaries in any court-ordered injunction.53 A court 
order could previously be delivered in the form of a targeted order 
specifying the type of blocking mode to be implemented by the 
intermediary, in contrast to a generic order, which simply states the goal of 
the injunction. The modes are given a simplified, brief description in the 
following, with emphasis placed on their relative cost, invasiveness and ease 
of circumvention.  
 
3.2.1 DNS blocking 
The Domain Name System (DNS) translates a domain name (such as 
www.infringer.com) into a specific Internet Protocol address (IP address). 
By adjusting their DNS server settings, a connectivity provider may block 
access to the domain in question for all its users. As a rather primitive and 
imprecise way of denying access to a specific website, DNS blocking is 
easily circumvented by Internet users.54 DNS blocking is relatively 
inexpensive to implement; owever, it is plagued with issues of inefficacy 
and a notable risk of over-blocking, as sites with both legal and illegal 
content suffers a complete blocking of its entire domain name.55 
                                                
52 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 61. 
53 See below at 4.4. 
54 Feiler, supra note 17, p. 7. 
55 Wang, F. F., ‘Site-blocking Orders in the EU: Justifications and Feasibility’, 14th 
Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of 
California, Berkeley, August 7-8, (2014), p. 2. Available at: 
 26 
 
3.2.2 IP blocking 
When blocking an IP address, the connectivity provider blacklists a certain 
IP address, shutting down traffic to the server of the infringing website – a 
blocking method more difficult to circumvent than DNS blocking, though 
far from impossible.56 As IP addresses often store a vast number of 
websites, IP blocking bears the risk of “over blocking”; as a result, sites 
carrying mainly legal content may be unintentionally affected.57 IP blocking 
is cost efficient in its simplicity. The ease with which it may be 
circumvented, i.e. its efficiency, lies somewhere between DNS and DPI-
enhanced URL blocking; the latter described below.58  
 
3.2.3 URL blocking 
The third main type of blocking used consists of the ISP examining the 
actual content of the information with deeper scrutiny than IP blocking; in 
layman-terms, it filters out what websites to block by a more invasive and 
costly procedure than IP or DNS blocking; URL blocking is thus more 
difficult for both the website operator and the user to circumvent, and allows 
for more precise blocking.59 URL blocking may be implemented in various 
ways. One common method is that of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), in 
which the actual data transmitted is monitored, and not only the type.60 As a 
crude allegory, the difference may be likened to opening a letter and reading 
its contents, rather than merely judging it by its “cover”. 
 
                                                                                                                        
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Wang_Faye_Fangfei_IPSC_paper_2014.pdf, 
last visited on February 12, 2015. 
56 Husovec, M., Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking, 
JIPITEC, Vol. 4, (2013), p. 122. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2318631_code1137858.pdf?abstractid=
2257232&mirid=1, last visited on February 13, 2015. 
57 Feiler, supra note 17, pp. 9-10. 
58 Feiler, supra note 17, p. 9. 
59 Feiler, supra note 17, pp. 10-11, and Edwards, supra note 3, p. 53. 
60 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 53. 
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3.3 Countervailing rights to injunctions 
3.3.1 Right to Freedom of Information  
The right to freedom of information is a cornerstone of all democratic 
systems, and as such recognized as a fundamental right enshrined in Article 
11 of the EUC. The role of the Internet in enabling a free and effective 
exchange of ideas, opinions and information cannot be overstated. When 
information provided on the Internet is blocked it violates this fundamental 
right; at least on the outset. Blocking injunctions may thus be subject to a 
balancing act, as inferred from recital 2 of the Enforcement Directive, which 
expressively states that the freedom of information and expression shall not 
be hampered by the enforcement of IP rights. A disproportionate use of the 
enforcement options available is a possible future concern raised inter alia 
by the Council of Europe.61 
 
3.3.2 Right to Freely Conduct Business 
Article 16 of the EUC provides protection for the right to freely conduct 
business as yet another fundamental right. Its counterweight towards IPR 
enforcement is indeed obvious in cases where intermediaries are forced, by 
court order, to implement injunctions that are both time-consuming and 
costly. However, when this right has been balanced against the forced co-
opt enforcement of IP rights, the level of infringement in the intermediary’s 
freedom to conduct business would seem to have to reach levels which are 
remarkably flagrant in order for Article 16 to deny a blocking injunction.62 
This is further elaborated upon in chapter 5.5. 
 
                                                
61 Council of the European Union, EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression 
Online and Offline, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (2014), pp. 1 and 18. 
62 O’Sullivan, K., Enforcing copyright online: internet service provider obligations and the 
European Charter of Human Rights, European Intellectual Property Review, Vol. 36, Nr. 9, 
(2014), pp. 577-579. 
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3.3.3 Prohibition of imposing monitoring 
A more specific countervailing right is enshrined in Article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive. In order to set an absolute limit of the burdens that 
may be imposed upon intermediaries, the law of a member state cannot 
impose a general obligation to monitor the information they transmit or 
store, establishing a “ceiling” level of enforcement available through the 
directive.63  
 
This conflict was aptly scrutinized in the landmark CJEU case of Scarlet v. 
Sabam; for the presentation and analysis of this case, see below at 4.3. 
 
3.3.4 Data privacy protection 
The concern for data privacy protection is currently regulated within the 
Data Protection Directive64, which is set to be superseded by a uniform 
regulation, at the time of writing held under scrutiny and halted in the 
European Parliament due to differences of opinion between the member 
states regarding inter alia the scope of protection afforded.  
 
Article 5 obligates member states to provide confidentiality of private 
information, while Article 15 may restrict this obligation in the interest of, 
inter alia, national and public security, defence and prosecution of criminal 
offences – but not civil proceedings. 
 
Article 2 of the Data Protection Directive provides a definition of ‘personal 
data’, and though the interpretations of ‘personal data’ vary between 
member states, the information required to identify IP infringers (usually the 
IP address) constitutes personal data in most jurisdictions. As such, there 
must be a legitimate interest on par with the ‘data subject’s’ interest when 
                                                
63 Stamatoudi, supra note 34, pp. 795-796. 
64 The main focus of the Data Protection Directive lies closer to the debate of the right to be 
forgotten best illustrated in the case of Google Spain v. AEPD (C-131/12), but as stated in 
1.3, its treatment in this thesis is limited to its relevance to blocking injunctions. 
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harvesting and storing the personal data (which in turn is a requirement for 
proving the existence of an infringement, one of the absolute requirements 
for blocking injunctions), and as the CJEU case of Promusicae below 
illustrates,65 the IPR holders interest doesn’t necessarily outweigh privacy 
concerns.66 
 
3.4 Summarized topics of blocking order 
injunctions 
From a simplified viewpoint, the debate concerning blocking injunctions 
concerns appropriate standards, ranging from the minimum level of 
protection afforded to IP rights to its maximum “ceiling”.67 The issues at 
hand have crystallized themselves through debate within doctrine and, 
above all, the case law submitted to the CJEU.  
 
Before delving into the court’s examination of these issues, they may be 
summarized and sorted into the following categories below. 
 
Type of orders – generic or targeted (i.e. specific) orders  
Besides a variation in the range of measures imposed68, the question of 
whether a court may issue a targeted order was addressed by the CJEU as 
late as 2014. Moreover, the outcome has been criticised in doctrine and by 
the industry; the lack of guidance from the court, which instil an obligation 
upon an innocent intermediary without any guidance on how to fulfil it, may 
prove harmful to the business of intermediaries. Without adequately 
harmonizing how far this obligation goes, this may also lead to differing 
standards throughout the Union.69  
 
                                                
65 See below 4.1. 
66 Edwards, supra note 3, pp. 40-41. 
67 Husovec, supra note 56, pp. 117-118.  
68 DLA Piper, supra note 20, p. 22. 
69 Wang, supra note 55, p. 12. 
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The balancing of burdens between the IPR holder and the intermediary  
The cost of implementation is the main focus of balancing the burdens, and 
while the economical burden usually has befallen the intermediary (within 
reasonable extent), this topic is still debated as the proper balance has yet to 
find an objective standard.70 
 
Legality  
The legal framework contains an abundance of ambiguous terms lacking 
autonomous and harmonized definitions. Thus, questions of legal certainty 
and foreseeability have plagued both decisions and subsequent doctrine 
concerning blocking injunctions.71 For example, the European 
Commission’s assessment of the Enforcement Directive has raised issues 
concerning diverging interpretations of evidence and the level of certainty 
required by the courts when granting injunctions.72 The indefinite 
connection to liability mentioned above in 3.1.4.2 formed part of this issue 
in the early days of the Enforcement Directive’s application. 
 
Proportionality 
Last but undoubtedly not least, the proportionality assessment required by 
Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive is one of the most notably discussed 
and scrutinized issues, with openly varying case law in national courts.73 
Weighing the countervailing rights of the IPR holders towards the interests 
and rights of the public, the intermediaries and the affected end-users has 
proven complicated.74 
 
The following chapter examines how these issues have been approached by 
the CJEU when applying the described legal framework. 
                                                
70 Husovec, supra note 56, p. 125. 
71 Husovec, supra note 56, pp. 123-124. 
72 Kur, supra note 10, pp. 445-446. 
73 Kur, supra note 10, p. 453, and DLA Piper, supra note 20, p. 22. 
74 European Commission, supra note 28, p. 12. 
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4 CJEU Injunction Case Law 
In lack of a harmonized and standard formula applicable for issuing 
injunctions, a multitude of aspects (such as those of efficiency, 
proportionality, fairness and reasonability, all provided for in Article 3 of 
the Enforcement Directive) suddenly required interpretation when 
determining the validity of a sought blocking order. This required the courts 
to examine the arguments by IPR holders and defendants on a case-by-case 
basis.75 In national courts, injunctions have been granted in most, but not all, 
instances.76 This chapter examines four prominent cases that found their 
way to the CJEU and cumulatively contain the essentials for determining the 
requisites of blocking injunctions. 
 
4.1 Promusicae v. Telefonica 
The case of Promusicae v. Telefónica was to be amongst the first of many 
cases where representatives of IPR holders sue a connectivity provider 
intermediary demanding an injunction.77 When trying to extract personal 
data information on Telefónica’s end-users engaged in P2P file sharing, the 
CJEU was faced with the question of whether such a request could be 
sought in a civil proceeding on the basis of EU law protecting IP rights such 
as Article 8 of the Infosoc Directive.78 The Court clarified, with reference to 
the E-Commerce Directive, the Infosoc Directive, the Enforcement 
Directive and the Data Protection Directive, that such a request must weigh 
the interests of the IPR holders against the fundamental rights of privacy, as 
well as other fundamental rights enshrined in the directives. The privacy 
obligation laid down in the Data Protection Directive, which references the 
right to privacy enshrined in Article 7 and 8 of the EUC, must accordingly 
                                                
75 Savola, supra note 25, p. 119. 
76 Feiler, supra note 17, p. 22.  
77 Promusicae v. Telefónica de España (C-275/06). 
78 Promusicae v. Telefonica, para 58. 
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be balanced towards the IP rights and adjoining rights to an effective 
remedy.79 Promusicae became the first CJEU verdict stating that IP rights 
are far from absolute, and that a proportionality assessment is always 
inherent when enforcing them. 
 
4.2 L’Oreal v. eBay 
In 2007, L’Oreal brought a lawsuit against eBay to the UK High Court for 
infringement of their trade mark rights.80 The case concerned both the 
liability of eBay, as well as possibilities of injunctive relief.  Although the 
subject-matter of the IP rights concerned trade marks rather than the more 
often debated copyright, all of the aspects below are relevant for nearly all 
cases of IP infringement injunctions towards intermediaries. 
 
According to the CJEU, eBay enjoyed the liability exemption of the hosting 
defence under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, due to their passive 
role.81 As mentioned above in 3.1.4.2, liability was at the time a possible 
factor when assessing the validity of an injunction. The CJEU chose to 
address this notion, concluding that the operator of a marketplace may, on 
the basis of the third sentence in Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive, be 
ordered to take measures against infringers using their services irrespective 
of their own liability. Contrary to some member states’ requirement of 
determining liability on the part of the intermediary, liability was proven as 
unnecessary, and ruled out as a requisite per se.82 
 
It is also noteworthy that the injunctions imposed on an intermediary also 
may entail preventing future infringements. Injunctions may therefore also 
carry a preventive function – i.e. it is not necessary that an infringement 
                                                
79 Promusicae v. Telefonica, paras. 64-70. 
80 L’Oreal v. eBay (C-324/09). 
81 L’Oreal v. eBay, para. 124, see also the distinctive difference in the required level of 
passivity for different providers described in chapter 2.2. 
82 L’Oreal v. eBay, paras. 127-134. This reasoning of the CJEU echoes in the European 
Commissions analysis, see supra note 28, p. 16; without a literal reference to L’Oreal v. 
eBay, but quite obviously influenced. 
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already has been committed (as suggested by the wording in Art 8 (3) 
Infosoc and Art 11 of the Enforcement Directive), but it is sufficient that the 
injunction may prevent any future infringements of the same kind that has 
occurred. If, for example, an injunction is brought based on infringement of 
type A by infringer X, the injunction also serves to enforce the intermediary 
to prevent infringements of type A by any other infringer. This preventive 
function was balanced towards the monitoring prohibition of Article 15 in 
the E-Commerce Directive, with an outcome that leaves the reader uncertain 
to its actual extent as the type of infringement was described only as 
“further infringements of that kind”, without any further definition.83 
  
The principle of effet utile, i.e. member states’ responsibility to fulfil the 
objectives of each directive adopted, was heralded as guidance for national 
law in determining what minimum protection must be awarded to the IPR 
holders.84 Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive was held as the framework 
for this balancing act, stating that the injunctions must be effective, 
proportionate, dissuasive, fair and equitable; they must not crate barriers to 
legitimate trade, and in whole, must strike a fair balance between the rights 
of the interested parties.85  
 
4.3 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM 
SABAM, the collective copyright society of Belgium, sought to impose 
upon Scarlet Extended, an ISP also situated in Belgium, an obligation to 
install a filtering system in order to the combat their users’ copyright 
infringements.86 The method suggested an invasive method of DPI-
filtering87, essentially making all traffic, both legal and illegal, prone to 
inspection by Scarlet Extended on its own expense and for an unlimited 
amount of time. 
                                                
83 L’Oreal v. eBay, para. 144. 
84 L’Oreal v. eBay, paras. 131-137. 
85 L’Oreal v. eBay, paras. 125-143. 
86 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM (C-70/10). 
87 For a short description of DPI, see above in 3.2.3. 
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The ISP therefore appealed, leading the Belgian court to seek advice on 
whether such an injunction was precluded by the fundamental rights 
enshrined not in the EUC but the ECHR, and if not, whether EU law require 
the national court to undertake a proportionality test.88 The reason for the 
Belgian court to reference the ECHR is not expressively clear, but perhaps 
by referring to an international convention aimed specifically at human 
rights, the national court sought to emphasize the privacy concerns from a 
more unmitigated human rights perspective. The EU is set to formally 
accede to the ECHR, and the fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR 
already form part of the general principles of EU law.89 Hence, its relevance 
was indeed justified, though as seen below not reflected in the final 
judgment of the CJEU. 
 
The CJEU referenced L’Oreal v. eBay, stating that an intermediary indeed 
may be required to take measures to prevent future infringements, which the 
filtering system at hand undoubtedly was aimed at.90  
 
Further, drawing upon the judgment of Promusicae, a proportionality 
assessment was indeed found necessary as IP rights had to be balanced 
against the interests of all parties involved.91 However, the CJEU chose to 
rephrase the question in two aspects: they divided the proportionality 
assessment between on one hand the IPR holders’ interests vis-à-vis Scarlet 
Extended in their role as an intermediary and their subsequent right to 
freedom to conduct a business enshrined in Article 16 of the EUC, and one 
the other hand the IPR holders and the end-users, whose right to protection 
of personal data is found in Article 8 of the EUC and the Data Protection 
Directive, as well as their right to freedom of information enshrined in 
Article 11 of the EUC. The fundamental freedoms were therefore referred to 
                                                
88 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, para. 28. 
89 The Lisbon Treaty, Article 6 (2) and (3). 
90 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, para. 31. 
91 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, para. 44. 
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in a more ‘pure’ EU law context; reference to fundamental rights was 
preferably to be drawn directly from secondary EU law and the EUC.92 
 
The CJEU concluded that with regard to the interests of Scarlet Extended, 
the injunction violated the monitoring prohibition in Article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive and constituted a “serious infringement of the freedom 
of the ISP concerned to conduct its business”.93  
 
With regard to Scarlet Extended’s users, the CJEU found that the injunction 
“may infringe” their right to protection of privacy and freedom of 
expression, the latter specifically with regard to the risk of lawful content 
being blocked by the filtering system.94 It would therefore seem that the 
CJEU held the economic interests of the ISP as the prominent factor in 
determining the disproportionality of the injunction; the rights of the end-
users may have added more weight to the scales, but perhaps due to a lack 
of a more in-depth understanding of the technology at hand, the CJEU, by 
their choice of wording, lay their emphasis on the economic implications at 
hand.95 
 
4.4 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin 
The ruling in UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin96 somewhat mirrors the 
theme of this thesis in that the CJEU began by stating their assumption that 
an IPR infringement already was at hand; thus, the CJEU focused purely on 
the requisites and assessments of proportionality with regard to blocking 
injunctions.97  
 
                                                
92 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, paras. 47-53. 
93 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, paras. 47-48. 
94 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, paras. 50-52. 
95 Psychogiopoulou, E., Copyright enforcement, human rights protection and the 
responsibilities of internet service providers after Scarlet, in European Intellectual Property 
Review (EIPR) Vol. 34, nr. 8, (2012), p. 555. 
96 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin (C-314/12). 
97 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para. 24. 
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Constantin and Wega, two Austrian film production companies, sued UPC 
Telekabel (henceforth “UPC”), an Austrian ISP, requiring UPC to block 
their users’ access to the website kino.to, which offered streaming services 
that infringed the rights of Constantin and Wega. UPC claimed they 
couldn’t be viewed as an intermediary and further stated that even if this 
was the case, the measures available could all be circumvented, and were 
therefore inefficient in relation to the goal of blocking injunctions. UPC also 
made note of the excessive costs of many of the available implementation 
measures.98 These latter two grounds for appeal were made without 
reference to any particular requisite of efficiency or proportionality, which 
lead the Austrian court to rephrase the question by asking whether a 
measure requiring ”not inconsiderable costs” which ” can easily be 
circumvented” was compatible ”with Union law”.99 
 
The ruling concerns two questions: whether UPC acted as an intermediary 
in the context of Article 8 (3) of the Infosoc Directive, and whether the 
generic order100 issued by the appeal court of Austria was justifiable in 
respect of the parties’ fundamental rights. 
 
Was UPC an intermediary? 
UPC claimed they could not be construed as an intermediary, since they had 
no contractual relationship with the operators of the infringing website. 
Further, it was not proven that the users of UPC had acted unlawfully.101 
 
The CJEU pointed to recital 9 of the Infosoc Directive, stating the 
directive’s aim to provide a high level of protection to IP rights. From an 
implicit interpretation of the directive’s effet utile, a contractual relationship 
between the intermediary and the infringer is thus not required.102  
 
                                                
98 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para. 16. 
99 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para. 17. 
100 The differences of targeted and generic orders are described above in 3.2. 
101 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para. 16. 
102 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, paras. 32-35. 
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As to the possible infringements of UPC’s users, the CJEU referenced the 
court in Scarlet Extended v. Sabam103 when maintaining that prevention is a 
sufficient goal of an injunction – proof of the intermediaries’ users having 
actually used the services is thus not required either.104 
 
Was the generic order towards UPC justifiable under EU law? 
The CJEU began by pointing out that the material rules of injunctions are, 
according to recital 59 of the Infosoc Directive, a matter for national law. 
However, the limitations that stem from the sources of law provided by the 
directive must be respected; here, we are able to trace a coherent line of 
relevant case law as the CJEU refers to the paragraphs of Scarlet Extended 
v. Sabam, which in turns references the ruling of L’Oreal v. eBay, which in 
turn lastly reference the findings of the court in Promusicae.105 
 
Thus, the CJEU matter-of-factly lines up the countervailing rights at stake: 
IP rights as protected by Article 17 of the EUC, versus firstly the 
intermediary’s freedom to conduct a business (Art 16 EUC) and secondly 
UPCs’ users’ right to freedom of information (Art 11 EUC).106 
 
The CJEU found that a generic order indeed infringes the intermediary’s 
freedom to conduct a business, but not the “very substance” of this freedom 
due to the fact that the intermediary is able to choose the implementation 
method best suited to its possibilities, and in that further liability may be 
avoided by proving it has taken “all reasonable measures” of 
implementation. The CJEU describes this as the ability to prove that “the 
measures taken were indeed those which could be expected of him in order 
to prevent the proscribed result.”107 
 
                                                
103 See 4.3 above. 
104 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, paras. 36-39. 
105 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, paras. 43-45. For the relevant arguments of L’Oreal 
v. eBay and Promusicae, see 4.2 and 4.1 respectively above. 
106 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para. 47. 
107 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, paras. 52-54. 
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Countering UPCs argument regarding inefficiency of the measures available, 
the CJEU declared that this requisite (inter alia inherent in Article 3 of the 
Enforcement Directive) is already fulfilled when merely making it difficult 
to achieve access to the protected subject-matter, and seriously discourages 
Internet users from it.108 
 
As for the argument of excessive costs, the CJEU gave sparse counter-
argument: it is on the one hand considered part of the infringement upon the 
intermediary’s freedom to conduct a business – but as the court offered no 
further analysis of the issue, the CJEU seemingly found this obstacle 
vanquished by allowing the intermediary to choose the method of 
implementation itself.109 
 
A final but quite important point raised in the balancing of interests at hand 
concerned the end-users of the intermediary. The measures adopted must be 
“strictly targeted”. As the measures imposed by a blocking order may 
infringe upon their right to freedom of information, the CJEU found that 
such affected parties must be awarded locus standi once the actual measures 
to be implemented are known.110 This specific aspect is analysed further 
below in chapter 5.6. 
 
                                                
108 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para. 63. 
109 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, paras. 50-52. 
110 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, paras. 55-57.  
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5 Analysis of requisites 
Reviewing the legal basis of blocking injunctions and their subsequent 
application in case law, a definite number of factors emerge as mandatory 
when assessing the requisites. As to their order and application, the need for 
clarification may still lie inherent in order for blocking injunctions to reach 
the effect desired by its legislators.111 Nonetheless, an attempt to summarize 
these, along with an interwoven analysis of their potential application 
follows. 
 
5.1 Type of infringement 
Without infringement of a protected right, there can be no ground for 
issuing an injunction. This thesis works on the assumption that an 
infringement by a third-party has already been committed. But does the 
subject-matter infringed upon affect the assessment of a blocking injunction 
in any of its latter stages? The higher consumer demand of copyright 
infringing content vis-à-vis trademark infringing goods provides for 
stronger incentives (for end-users) to circumvent blocking in copyright 
cases. Thus, injunctions that create high transaction costs for consumers, 
that is to say copyright injunctions, would from an economically influenced 
standpoint have a lower threshold of “necessity” to overcome.112 The 
stronger regulation of copyright compared to trademark rights further this 
argument.113 Subsequently, obtaining an injunction on the basis of 
trademark infringement would prove more difficult, as high transaction 
costs for consumers carry less effect when consumers are unwilling to “pay 
the higher price” for trademark infringing goods.114 Seeing how the vast 
majority of blocking injunctions brought before the CJEU concerns 
                                                
111 As observed by the European Commission in their analysis of the Enforcement 
Directive, see supra note 28, pp. 25-26; see also Wang, supra note 55, p. 8. 
112 Husovec, supra note 56, p. 121. 
113 Savola, supra note 25, p. 118. 
114 Husovec, supra note 56, p. 122. 
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copyright infringements; hence, the type of infringement may influence the 
assessment in the aforementioned way. 
 
5.2 The intermediary and its services 
Defining the intermediary in the sense of Article 11 and Article 8 (3) of the 
Enforcement Directive and Infosoc Directive respectively is the first 
requirement, and an easy one; it is unchallenged in most cases presented 
above in chapter 4 and as evidenced earlier, its definition may include 
anyone who provides ‘technical support and services in and around the 
internet’.115 The intermediaries’ services must further be used to commit an 
infringement in the sense required by the above-mentioned articles; again, a 
requisite that offer little resistance. As evidenced by UPC Telekabel Wien v. 
Constantin, no contractual relationship between the intermediary and the 
infringer is required.116 In this regard, it should be noted that Article 8 (3) of 
the Infosoc Directive functions as lex specialis for copyright infringements. 
 
What of the distinction between different types of intermediaries – most 
importantly connectivity vis-à-vis hosting providers? When seeking an 
injunction aimed at blocking a website located in the same member state as 
the connectivity provider, the rationale of the Infosoc Directive found in 
recital 59 suggests “targeting” the hosting provider rather than the 
connectivity provider, at least from a standpoint of efficiency. However, 
taking into account the ease with which a website operator may transfer the 
website, as well as the time required to enforce an injunction granted in 
another member state, the choice of targeting an end-user ISP would meet 
the requirements of recital 59 in cases where the infringing website is 
located in a member state different from the connectivity provider. As for 
websites outside of the EU, it is self-evident that the local connectivity 
                                                
115 See above 3.1.2. 
116 See above 4.4. 
 41 
provider is best placed to bring the infringing activities to an end.117 Case 
law has as of yet to further illuminate the “pecking-order” of target 
intermediaries, perhaps largely due to the margin of appreciation afforded to 
the member states by way of recital 59 of the Infosoc Directive. It may 
however be observed that the infringer definitely uses the services of the 
intermediary when the latter acts as connectivity provider of the infringing 
website – but in the light of UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, the requisite 
of use need only be potential, due to the preventive function of 
injunctions.118 
 
The mode with which the infringement occurs may carry implications for 
which intermediaries run the risk of fulfilling the requisite of “best suited” 
under recital 59 of the Infosoc Directive. With regard to file sharing, the 
content may be transmitted by multiple ISPs from one region to another, 
creating a situation where injunctions may be relevant towards all ISPs in a 
country. In contrast, infringement through e.g. streaming, only the ISP 
providing access to the infringing website host would communicate the 
content, and the injunction can only be directed towards this 
intermediary.119 The preventive approach argued by the CJEU in L’Oreal v 
eBay may however provide a basis for including other intermediaries in 
these cases as well; it is still undetermined in EU case law. 
 
How the intermediaries’ services are used may form an important part of the 
assessment as well; the ratio of lawful versus illegal content that flows 
through the medium and consequently may be subject to blocking is usually 
dependant on the type of service provided by the intermediary. Sites who 
rely on user-mediated content require a more in-depth assessment, in order 
to not infringe upon end-users’ rights to freedom of information.120 
 
                                                
117 Feiler, supra note 17, pp. 47-52. 
118 See above at 4.4. 
119 Husovec and Peguera, supra note 47, p. 6. 
120 As explained above in 4.3. 
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5.3 Blocking modes and sufficient legal 
basis 
The mode with which to implement the injunction is now essentially a 
matter of choice for the intermediary.121 As evidenced by case law, the 
methods may become subject to review by the CJEU, and this is still true 
with regard to the blocking modes’ actual effect when examining efficacy 
vis-à-vis end users’ fundamental rights.122 A mode of blocking that is unable 
to properly filter the lawful and illegal content may therefore risk infringing 
upon the right to freedom of information.123  
 
The Advocate General Cruz Villalón, who gave opinions on all the above 
four CJEU cases presented in chapter four, argues that issuing non-specific, 
generic blocking orders give rise to a possible dilemma of lack of sufficient 
legal basis as well as foreseeability. Villalón argues that the proper 
balancing of conflicting rights belong to the proceedings issuing the 
injunctions. With a generic order, the balancing becomes a later question; 
perhaps the ISP chooses a mild method, which may render it liable for later 
infringements, or the intermediary may overblock access to the Internet, 
rendering it liable towards end-users.124 As seen in UPC Telekabel Wien v. 
Constantin, the CJEU largely bypassed this by making the implementations 
optional to judicial review and awarding locus standi to end-users. Perhaps 
for the sake of legal certainty, the CJEU should have explored this issue 
further; among the few cases in national courts where blocking injunctions 
where denied, several outcomes depended on the lack of proper 
transposition of the legal basis for allowing blocking.125 
 
                                                
121 See above 4.4. 
122 Chiang, Y., Review of the CJEU Judgement on the Application of Site Blocking Order, 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Management, Vol. 3, (2014), pp. 211-212. 
123 Stamatoudi, supra note 6, p. 875. 
124 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien v. 
Constantin, paras. 73, 86-97. 
125 Feiler, supra note 17, pp. 27 and 29-30. 
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The type of blocking used raises three important aspects to factor in; 
efficiency, cost and risk of over-blocking. The modes and their qualities as 
to these factors have been described above in chapter 3.2. As both DNS and 
IP blocking are cheap but run the risk of over-blocking, these could in many 
cases present an inexpensive but hazardous mode of implementation for the 
ISP at hand.  URL blocking is the most expensive mode that best serves the 
CJEUs requisite of “strict targeting”, but rather than over-blocking, poses 
challenges towards the right of privacy for personal data through its invasive 
technology.126 
 
There are a multiple range of hybrid modes of blocking, and needless to say 
they influence the above three factors, regardless of their combination. Each 
factor weighs differently depending on the type of intermediary (its business 
models and subsequent business model). Admittedly, national courts faced 
with assessing an injunction may breath a sigh of relief in now being forced 
to leave the mode of blocking up to the intermediary; at least up until the 
point where the court is called to review the implemented measures, either 
by the intermediary, the website operator or the end-users. 
 
5.4 Efficency 
As required by Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive, the efficiency of the 
injunction is a requisite of central importance, yet the discussions 
surrounding this requirement diverge. National courts have previously 
refused injunctions based on reports stating both its relative and factual 
inefficiency, the latter argument pointing to evidence that all forms of 
blocking can be circumvented; others have sufficed in their deterring effect, 
potential or proven.127 The discussion has thus somewhat developed into a 
theorization of the abstract concept of efficiency, rather than focusing on 
                                                
126 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para 56. See further above at 4.4. 
127  See for instance, in the UK EMI Records Ltd and Others v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd 
and Others  (2013) EWHC 379 (Ch), [2013] WLR (D) 86, and in the Netherlands Ziggo 
B.V and XS4ALL Internet B.V v BREIN, (2014) case no. 200.105.418/01 374634/HA ZA 
10-3184, as referenced in O’Sullivan, supra note 62, pp. 579-581. 
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how it should be utilized in court. However, once the dust settles, the 
remaining standpoint should seem to focus on its outcome; the assessment 
of efficiency should not address whether the blocking measures can be 
circumvented, but rather if they will be.128 As such, the CJEU offers two 
requisites for efficiency: do the blocking measures make it difficult to 
achieve access to the protected subject-matter, and do they seriously 
discourage Internet users from it?129 The use of the word “and” 
demonstrates the cumulative nature of these requisites; the efficiency is 
therefore, to a certain degree, reliant on the actual behaviour of end-users.  
 
As with the mode of blocking used, the efficiency assessment also varies 
with the type of intermediary: injunctions towards larger connectivity 
providers may appropriately face a lower threshold due to the number of 
users blocked – as long as over-blocking is avoided.130 
 
5.5 Cost 
From the outset, it may seem like IPR holders are looking to bestow the 
responsibility of policing their rights upon Internet intermediaries rather 
than carrying out this task themselves.131 Originally an issue of debate, the 
costs of implementing the measures now seem to firmly rest on the 
intermediaries’ shoulders.  
 
Six years ago the opposing standpoint may have had more traction, as 
evidenced in a legal analysis commissioned by the European Commission’s 
Information Society and media Directorate-General.132 Still, as the burden 
of costs so far only has been determined in case law, often with disclaimers 
                                                
128 Feiler, supra note 17, p. 61. 
129 UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, para. 62. 
130 Feiler, supra note 17, p. 63. 
131 Edwards, supra note 3, p. 57. 
132 DLA Piper, supra note 20, p. 43. 
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stating the in casu nature of the placement of this burden, the issue is still 
open to debate.133 
 
The potentially excessive costs of implementation,134 raised by the 
intermediary in UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin did not pose much of a 
hindrance to the blocking order as long as the order is issued in a generic 
form, as such allowing the intermediary itself to regulate the cost to a 
certain extent.135  
 
It would seem, from the structuring of the arguments delivered by the CJEU 
in the said case, that a cost assessment falls under the umbrella of “all 
reasonable measures” – an intermediary would hardly be required to 
implement measures so costly they would substantially harm its business, 
this much is clear; but where is the line drawn? Must the “very substance”136 
of its freedom to conduct business be infringed upon? The practical issue of 
this is, judging by the CJEU and the legal framework, left as a matter to the 
national courts. A fixed quota is impossible, as the assessment must form 
part of the complex balancing towards efficiency.137 Depending on the 
function of the intermediary, this may lead to different outcomes: 
marketplaces such as eBay profit from the business of both legitimate and 
pirated goods on their websites – the close connection between the 
profitability of their business model and the infringing acts would 
accordingly justify placing the burden of costs, i.e. the ”policing” of the IPR 
holders’ rights, upon eBay and intermediaries with similar functions – as 
long as these costs would not drive them out of business.138 
 
With regard to the size of the intermediary, injunctions against larger service 
providers seem more likely to be granted, due to the efficiency assessment 
                                                
133 Stamatoudi, supra note 6, p. 874. 
134 Husovec, supra note 56, p. 125. 
135 See above in 4.4. 
136 The term used by the CJEU when referring to the subject matter of the freedom to 
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in estimating the number of users blocked  – which also strikes a fair 
balance of proportionality, as larger providers absorb costs more easily.139 
 
5.6 Affected users locus standi 
Following UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin, the end-users affected by the 
measures of a blocking injunction are entitled to locus standi when the 
measures of implementation are known.140 Does this affect the judicial 
review of issuing an injunction? One may rephrase the issue in order to 
provide clarification; will the injunction face rejection if the procedural rules 
of the member state don’t allow locus standi to affected third parties?141 If 
an Internet user or the website operator whose website is blocked wish to 
challenge the injunction, it follows from the CJEUs line of argumentation 
that the fundamental rights of the EUC actually precludes the injunction to 
be granted at all in such a case.142 Though neither stated in any regulative 
act of the legal framework of injunctions, nor included in the ratio decidendi 
of any CJEU case so far, this seems a clear and rational requisite of 
injunctions after UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin. 
 
5.7 Proportionality 
With all the above requisites gathered on the table, the framework that is 
Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive requires a final assessment of 
proportionality; a notion the CJEU made clear through Promusicae.143  
 
Drawing conclusions from the application of the general principle of 
proportionality in EU law,144 Savola portrays the proportionality assessment 
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140 See above 4.4. 
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as a four step-test, beginning with the legitimacy of the pursued objective, 
the suitability of an injunction, followed by estimating its necessity, and 
finally its proportionality stricto sensu, i.e. whether, regardless of its 
suitability and necessity, it imposes an unduly burden on the 
intermediary.145  
 
As mentioned previously, the question of liability for IP infringement varies 
for different types of intermediaries; most obviously with regard to 
connectivity and hosting providers.146 Savola argues that since liability 
differ between connectivity providers and hosting providers, this may affect 
the limitations of injunctions in a similar vein – as connectivity providers 
enjoy broader exemptions of liability than hosting providers, the limitations 
of injunctions should follow suit. A blocking order towards a hosting 
provider would be more proportionate than towards the connectivity 
provider involved, all other circumstances the same.147 Yet again, the 
interplay between requisites surfaces here; this time between the type of 
intermediary, type of infringement and modes of blocking available.  
 
Appropriately, all of the aforementioned requisites in this chapter form part 
of the proportionality assessment. The level of abstraction behind the 
guiding principles of proportionality provides the court faced with assessing 
the injunctions little guidance, which, in combination with the strong 
territoriality of copyright law has lead to divergence between national 
courts. Consequently, subsidiarity may be raised as yet another issue in the 
context of proportionality; has the IPR holder targeted the most relevant 
intermediary, and to what extent has the IPR holder made efforts to combat 
the infringement “at its source”, i.e. the infringing actor?148 
  
                                                                                                                        
144 Harbo, T., The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, European Law 
Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2010), pp. 158–185, as referenced by Savola in supra note 25, p. 
116. 
145 Savola, supra note 25, p. 116. 
146 See above 3.1.4.2. 
147 Savola, supra note 25, p. 117. 
148 Savola, supra note 43, p. 290, and Feiler, supra note 17, pp. 48-51. 
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The temporal aspect of the blocking injunction is yet another, albeit less 
complicated factor included in the proportionality assessment. As evidenced 
in Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, the disproportionality of an unduly 
burdensome injunction is inflated when not limited in time.149  
 
The balancing act between countervailing rights is conducted under the 
notion of proportionality. The views on what legal instruments such as 
regulations, directives, articles and recitals shall be deemed relevant differ in 
both case law and doctrine.150 In addition to the four-step test purported by 
Savola above, the Council of the European Union has suggested the three-
step evaluation contained in the EU Human Rights Guidelines, in which any 
restriction must be a) provided for by law, b) pursue a legitimate purpose 
and c) be proven necessary and as the least restrictive means required. The 
three-step evaluation invokes the principles of legal certainty, predictability, 
transparency, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality.151 Suffice to say, the 
well from which arguments can be drawn is deep. 
 
For the court faced with assessing the proportionality of a blocking 
injunction, the argument must evidently factor in all the above requisites in 
this chapter. A concise guideline as to how proportionality should apply 
falls short due to the multitude of possible outcomes the interplay between 
all relevant requisites generates.  
 
The conclusion is therefore rather that an assessment of the above criteria 
must at the very least take all of the above into consideration, establishing a 
schedule of factors tied to the proportionality assessment – whether this 
assessment is then brought to a fair conclusion rests upon the court’s 
competence in the matter. 
 
                                                
149 See above 4.3. 
150 O’Sullivan, supra note 62, pp. 582-583. 
151 EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline, referenced 
above supra note 61, p. 5. 
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Evidently, the European Union is in need of a harmonized assessment of 
proportionality when approaching the final requisite of assessing blocking 
injunctions; a view supported by the CJEU.152 However, the range of 
interpretations debated in the light of the proportionality requirement might 
rather be a healthy sign of awareness of its complexity, rather than distress 
of diverging opinions. 
 
                                                
152 Wang, supra note 55, p. 10. 
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6 Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis is to discern and appropriately evaluate the requisites 
of blocking injunctions towards intermediaries, while providing guidance to 
balancing the fundamental rights that are at play. Such an evaluation reveals 
many of the complex issues surrounding the legal regime of IP rights. The 
countervailing fundamental rights that must enjoy equitable treatment stem 
from a vast array of interests, reflected in the substantial list of aspects 
contained within the analysis above; from varying economical interests on 
both sides to concerns of privacy and freedom of information. The case law 
and analysis presented has served to illuminate how the recognized interests 
are translated into requisites and guiding principles. However, one must 
bear in mind that the judgments of the courts are but a legal decoction of the 
many underlying rationales that has led to the development of blocking 
injunctions being described as a paradigm in IPR enforcement. 
 
The reasoning behind bestowing obligations upon “innocent” intermediaries 
is based on one of many available views on their overarching role in society. 
The two extremes of the spectrum may be illustrated with likening their role 
to, on the one end, publishers; for instance newspaper publishers who are 
liable for the content made available. On the other end are wholly neutral 
common carriers, similar to e.g. postal and phone service providers; a view 
championed by ISPs in the early days of discussions regarding ISP liability. 
The lack of contractual relationship deemed as insufficient to exonerate 
ISPs from all obligations in UPC Telekabel Wien v. Constantin points to the 
former view having prevailed, seeing how “offline” publishers may 
contractually limit their responsibilities for the content they publish. 
 
These differing views represent the conflicting interests at stake, such as 
IPR holders’ property right interests, vis-à-vis public interest of freedom of 
expression, culture and innovation. Several of these interests may 
sometimes overlap – for instance, free circulation of protected works may 
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advance innovation, but a lack of effective enforcement may decrease 
incentives to invest, which would stall innovation. The blocking of larger 
sites with high amounts of dynamic content may also lead to blocking of 
lawful content, hindering users’ right to information. 
 
The purpose of website blocking may at first glance seem self-evident – an 
extended form of enforcing property rights – but the rationale behind 
assessing the underlying criteria is not as easily defined. With questions of 
efficiency still surrounding the discourse, the motives of IPR holders having 
changed their course from a prosecutorial to a preventive approach may 
indirectly influence why the requisites for injunctions are more easily 
fulfilled in some court cases, while other are rejected. Is the efficiency 
requisite a question of politically motivated deterrence rather than an 
effective redress? How should this aspect function if an intermediary 
obtains a court order stating that the measure suggested by the intermediary 
is sufficiently efficient, if a later judicial review proves the mode to be 
inefficient? The rationale behind efficiency seems dependent on its agenda. 
Reducing IPR holders economic losses, educating the public on the 
unlawfulness behaviour of IP infringement and symbolic displays of power 
towards “pro-piracy” lobbyists are recurring topics of discussion that may 
influence the legislation behind Europe’s differing copyright regimes, and 
thus invisible but perhaps implicit in the judgments of national courts. Is the 
real purpose actual enforcement of rights, or merely deterrence? Can 
blocking injunctions be construed as part of a larger scheme in fighting 
online piracy, where the effect of each injunction should take into account 
the synergy it might create with other forms of combating piracy, such as 
the targeting of individuals with damages and custodial sentencing?  
 
The national divergences in IP law, most evident in copyright law, 
automatically poses a threat of fragmentation for the internal market when 
faced with heavy enforcement procedures that rather illuminates the 
boundaries set by national copyright regimes than harmonize them. The 
legislators seem to have accepted this, as copyright was specifically set 
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aside from the prohibition of restricting freedom to provide information 
society services in the E-Commerce Directive. The source of this risk is not 
blocking injunctions in themselves – they are but a symptom of the lack of 
harmonization of copyright law; the injunctions often being the only 
effective means left. 
 
As the actual regulation of imposing injunctions is left up to the national 
courts, a harmonization of the requisites for blocking order injunctions 
would force national legislators and courts to alter their established 
doctrines when weighing IPR protection against their countervailing rights 
and freedoms, disrupting the discretion bestowed upon them by the 
Enforcement Directive. What effect does this have upon an attempt to find 
the common denominators of the criteria laid down by the legal framework 
of the EU, and the case law of the CJEU? 
 
The requisites presented and analysed in chapter five are requisites any 
assessment of a blocking injunction cannot escape. The proportionality 
assessment must balance them towards their countervailing rights. Hence, 
the proportionality assessment is the overarching platform upon which all 
the relevant requisites are ultimately tested. The lack of a clear guideline on 
how the proportionality shall be evaluated as shown by the multitude of 
instruments and considerations in case law is, by evidence of the complexity 
contained within such an assessment, not necessarily a sign of failure to 
harmonize or equip the injunction regime with sufficient legal 
foreseeability, but rather a strong indication of an awareness of the elaborate 
nature of the proportionality assessment. When defining the proportionality 
requisite, for example within the context of a court blocking order, it is more 
important to showcase that the other requisites presented in chapter five are 
taken into account, and given due consideration. The outcome of this 
assessment, which in turn will depend on the individual court’s review of 
each separate criteria and the special circumstances surrounding each 
injunction case, will therefore follow general principles of what to assess, 
but its outcome will be a ruling in casu. 
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It is important to notice the two-way burden of obligations borne by the ISP 
when implementing a blocking order, as they must balance the enforcement 
of IP rights while making sure that end-users’ right to freedom of 
information (and any other fundamental right that might be infringed upon 
through their implementation of the injunction) are upheld. When 
contemplating a new business model, the unpredictability of responsibility 
for the content that may be generated on their sites may lead intermediaries 
to refrain from certain ventures; once again, hindering innovation. 
 
Leaving the assessment of a factual requisite of the blocking injunction to 
the intermediary, at least up until the point where the blocking mode is 
called into question, is an overly simplified solution to a tortuous issue. A 
review of the blocking mode may be called into action not only upon 
challenge from the intermediary or the IPR holder, but also any affected 
user due to their locus standi awarded by the CJEU. It is undoubtedly a 
difficult task set upon the intermediary, especially those with limited 
resources and knowledge of blocking implementation, to first assess what 
level of blocking fulfils the requirements of efficiency, and to then balance 
this towards possible infringements upon end-users’ rights. There are of 
course practical reasons for leaving this assessment to the intermediary – 
they would in most cases be better suited to assess the technical aspects than 
any court would – but one cannot help but feel that the argument of having 
retained the intermediaries “freedom” by allowing them to choose their own 
mode of blocking comes packaged with a heavy burden of legal 
assessments.  
 
As it stands, the uncertainties surrounding the legal composition of 
European blocking injunctions are indeed deserving of clarification, and the 
courts tasked to apply these powers entitled to more guidance. However, 
one cannot escape the conclusion that where legal remedies, moulded and 
shaped by centuries of disparate national legal traditions, intertwine with 
global human rights and an unprecedented rapid development of technology 
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to form a coherent and harmonized supranational framework, complex 
issues will arise. As long as the courts of Europe recognize this through 
severe and meticulous review afforded to each relevant requisite, the 
inherent issues of blocking injunctions are still solvable by carefully 
harmonizing the differing national IPR regimes. The path to harmonisation 
and foreseeability is thus doubtlessly long and winding, but its importance 
well worth the journey. 
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